Putin did it, he invaded Ukraine. His military operation continues there, with all force and determination, indifferent to all the "cold and slow" threats emanating from the West if compared to the heat and escalation of events. Putin is also indifferent to the economic sanctions targeting Russian individuals, institutions, government, and others. The Russian Ministry of Defense says that orders were given to Russian forces, to launch a large-scale attack from all sides in Ukraine.

Putin did it in Ukraine, as he previously did in Syria. Should some think that the situation in Ukraine is different, in the respect that of the Russian intervention there is targeting the state and the government, unlike in Syria, where he came to support the Syrian state against its enemies. However, the similarities between the two cases, whether in terms of association with the international conflict, the domestic crisis severity, or the aggravation of the human suffering of citizens, are much more than this aspect of difference.

The first and most important aspect of similarities between the two countries — Syria and Ukraine — are that Russia has made them an arena of its struggle against regional and global powers, with the aim of reasserting itself as a feared superpower, and that other states and world powers should take Moscow's concerns, apprehensions, and interests into account, as serious and as a priority. The situation in the two countries is similar, in terms of the level of Russian intervention and how clear it is. Moscow was never shy, whether yesterday in Syria or today in Ukraine, as it intervened at high levels; directly through its forces and equipment, and indirectly by handing over equipment to the Syrian army, selling modern military systems, and training its forces. Russia carried on what it was doing in order to achieve its main goal — albeit partially — when all military operations on most Syrian territory were almost halted.

Today, the Russian forces are sweeping Ukraine, at the same level of high engagement, striking on several fronts, and destroying Ukrainian airports, camps, and bases. I think that this operation will be take a long time, but in return it will not be halted until Russia achieves all the objectives it wants, according to its officials' statements since the beginning of the military operation to the present day.

This is the greatest "danger" posed by any Russian intervention anywhere in the world, whether in favor of or against a government. Russia has always had a strategic goal that goes beyond Moscow's military operations as a mere tool, through which it gains international influence, power, and prestige to confront the European West to some extent, and the American West first and foremost. In fact, Russia has been able to take advantage of the near-total deficit shown by its opponents, and the strong reluctance to take any meaningful step, the matter that allowed the Russian leadership to raise the confrontation to high levels in Ukraine today.

However, Moscow may not be able to decide how the end would be the same way it decided how the start can be. It may leave things suspended in Ukraine as they are today in Syria. Neither Russia, which supported the Syrian government by all military, logistical, and security means, is able alone to decide on a political settlement of the Syrian crisis, nor does the reluctant America -along with Europe- care to contribute in resolving the Syrian crisis and allow reconstruction, as both teams are lurking behind the conditions and demands of their interest, or -at least- the demands that harms the interests and calculations of the other party. So, time erodes the Syrian issue and its population. The longer the Syrian crisis continues, the more the suffering of the Syrian people there is, which will lead many Syrians to migrate abroad, and repeat the experience of death boats again.

Meanwhile in Ukraine, talking about reconstruction began simultaneously with dealing with the escalating waves of asylum. The the number of Ukrainian refugees exceeded one million. Although Europe has declared its willingness to deal with this file, in more than a country, to its fullest potential, but this will not, as usual, significantly reduce what a people, who have nothing to do with the exacerbating international conflict, may suffer.

Blurry Possibilities and Multiple Scenarios

In addition to what I have outlined above, the most serious thing about Syria is that the escalation of the events, that we are witnessing in Ukraine, suggests that the escalation in Syria is also coming and is necessary, whether Russia achieves its goals in Ukraine or not, and whether it emerges strongly victorious or suffers a major defeat. The evolution of the global implications of the Ukrainian file reveals that the Russian victory will not be easy if it is to happen. It will, rather, force Moscow to double focus its efforts on its borders. It is never unlikely that the West will seek to press hard at that time, in order to oust Russia from Syria, as a prelude to end Russia's influence in the Middle East. Therefore, a victory here, and a defeat there, will not bring Putin a complete victory.

But in case Russia is defeated in Ukraine; although this cannot yet be truly predicted, let alone the possibility of predicting what such defeat will look like, Russia's exit from Ukraine without achieving its declared objectives will break the thorn of its globally rising power. This will tempt the West to further punish it by confronting it in Syria, after Russian forces there would become mere remnants of Russia's project on the European mainland.

As for the third possibility, i.e., the Russian military operation on Ukraine in the open-time dilemma, while Moscow's would be unable to resolve the situation; the situation is likely to develop into a military clash between Russia and the West. This clash will be opened to several possibilities as well, and will be expected to be in Syria more than being in Ukraine. This speculation comes against the backdrop of considerations that push the United States, and the allaying NATO, to be wary of a direct clash with Russia in Ukraine, considering that the latter is a Russian red line due to its geographical proximity to Russia. Moscow, from its side, considers Ukraine a strategic depth and a vital area for it. therefore, it is not unlikely that the confrontation will land in Syria, where the forces of both sides are present, especially with the UN resolution No. 2254, and its differing interpretations, can be used by the Russians or the Americans as they may favor.

The Russians seem to are prepared for all these possibilities; despite the confidence they show in achieving what they want. This is indicated in a report at the Russian newspaper (Nezavisimaya Gazeta) that the repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis may appear in Syria, where military forces are present for both Russia and the United States of America. The newspaper indicated that Pentagon's Office of inspector general accused the Russian forces in Syria of violating protocols of understanding between the two sides. Such protocols took exhausting efforts by Moscow and Washington to develop and agree, in order to prevent any confrontation in Syria. Although a slight breach of such protocols could occur between the two parties, before the situation returns to normal, the global situation is now so critical that this U.S. statement should thoroughly be considered.

In the same context, the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's visit to Damascus, which coincided with the start of the escalation in Ukraine, was deemed, by some, as a warning message that Russia wanted to convey to the United States and NATO, which is that Moscow would not hesitate to use its strategic facilities in Syria, if there was a military confrontation with NATO.

These circumstances, therefore, confirm that the flare-up in the main battle in Ukraine, does not eliminate the fact that the reserve battle in Syria might erupt when one or all the parties -the Russians and the West, America in particular- would have to resort to escalation. It would also be unlikely that the escalation there would go beyond the Russian and U.S. forces, as their multiple and complex conflicts could also include Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Europe. The re-escalation between the Syrian government and the opposition is no exception, either from the Side of Turkish-backed jihadist formations in the northwest of the country, or from U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in the north and northeast. The only constant in all of this is that Syria will be the biggest casualty under all these possibilities.

At the sub-military level, we may see further sanctions imposed on Syria, after we felt some optimism about lifting some sanctions, and the leniency, or lack of implementation for such sanctions, which means further exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis, and a possible further deterioration of the tragic situation of the majority of the Syrian people, in a state of slow mass death as a result of suffering at all levels, the absence of basic services, the increasing level of poverty, and the high prices of basic materials.

But even if we suppose the world is preoccupation from imposing new sanctions on Damascus, the mere flare-up of the war between Russia and Ukraine has a direct global impact on important economic issues, for energy and food sources. It will be normal that these effects will increase as the fighting continues, and Syria will be the one who suffers the most, where more severe disasters for Syrians in food, health, and energy resources will be caused in the country, as their living crisis reaches unprecedented levels over the past two years.

Ukraine and Syria: Two Local Arenas of International Wars

Since Putin's decision to intervene in Syria in 2015, Russia pursued a policy of deliberate steps, and reconciliation between war and diplomacy. Putin's forces participated in tracking and eliminating terrorist organizations, in restoring the state to a large part of its territory, and in achieving relative levels of appeasement in some places, whether through "military intervention" or through "reconciliations". We can only say that the situation in Syria, before Russian intervention, is not at all the same after Russian intervention, especially with the cessation of operations in several areas, specifically in major cities and their vicinities, such as Damascus and Aleppo to name a few. This has had a positive impact on the security stability that Syria has experienced in recent years.

However, the problem is not here. Its solution does not depend on what the Russians succeeded to achieve in Syria so far. All is well if ends well, and half solutions in files such as the Syrian file, means that the prospects for escalation are not over yet, it also means that the crisis scenarios may be realized at any moment. The sparks are still under the ashes, and may return to ignition by any domestic or international factor. What raises concern in such regard is the unpredictability of Russian behavior, and how serious Moscow is in going too far on Syrian affairs, and whether it has a comprehensive, integrated, and viable strategic vision that is capable of putting an end to this long-standing crisis? Even if the answer is yes, what destiny awaits this vision in the light of Moscow's new war?

Therefore, the most treacherous scenario, on the Syrian scene, remains related to Moscow's adherence to its "strong" papers in Syria, where it is theoretically able to counter U.S. presence and influence in the entire Middle East, while staying away from the US controlled territory, the matter that would increase Russia's appearance as America's strong and balanced rival in the region, as well as be the rival of Europe in the Mediterranean. This means that prolonging the already debilitating crisis in Syria does not harm Russia's interests, rather, serves it.

The problem is not the Russian presence itself. Every State has the right to choose its allies, and determine who can establish bases and camps on its territory. However, Russia's presence, in such strategy, will not be reflected positively on the Syrian interior, as it will not put an end to Iranian intimidation, or the direct threat it poses to Israel. At the same time, it will not while prevent the latter from repeating air strikes on Syrian military positions, under the pretext of targeting Iranian military positions, installations, or Iranian personnel. The bottom line is that Syria's vital areas will remain in an Iranian-Israeli danger. This is in addition to that all the country's problems and further complicating, added to the already complexed crisis.

All Wars are Unfair for Peoples

Syria and Ukraine share the same calamity, the calamity of Western hesitation, miscalculation, and disregard for the Russian reaction. When I talk about this hesitation, I do not mean in any way the military confrontation against Moscow, I am a supporter of peace and peaceful solutions everywhere on this planet. What I mean is the call for negotiations, putting all possible solutions on the table, and looking through dialogue for new solutions suitable for everyone. The Westerners — and Americans in particular — were not serious about Syria, especially in the last two years. They witnessed promising Arab initiatives to resolve things and end their crisis. But America's will was not yet been decisive. Also, in Ukraine, the Westerners have not made clear any assurances or assurances that they will not include Ukraine in NATO, although it is impossible to do so. No one needs to raise the Russian Bear and push it beyond its danger in terms of its activities in Ukraine today. Nor did the Westers engage in a comprehensive dialogue that could end, perhaps via Russia's membership in NATO, ending the Ukrainian crisis, and closing the door forever to any future Eurasian crises.

The West should not exclude its responsibility, offering only good intentions, and then not support its claim and intentions with actions, that confirm and augment its claims and intentions. Just as the screams today in Ukraine, the pain is there also in Syria. Just as Russia is responsible, America is also responsible, first: because of its haste in military solutions, and the second: because of its lack of diplomatic solutions. As I previously said, It is not unlikely that the intensification of confrontations on the Ukrainian front will lead to a new escalation on the Syrian scene, especially since the intentions of escalation between the two parties, Russian and Western, in the Ukrainian crisis, are the highest yet of any other intentions, but the slightly shifting path towards being calm, negotiation, sitting for dialogue between Moscow and the West, and the initial acceptance of mutual concessions in exchange for common gains, can have a positive impact on the Ukrainians. And the Syrians, too. Can this be achieved? I do hope so!

Author: Hasan Ismaik STRATEGIECS Chairman