The clashes between Hezbollah and Israel have escalated and accelerated on both sides of the Lebanon-Israeli border in the quality and quantity of mutual strikes. Israel has intensified its airstrikes against the infrastructure and leaders of Hezbollah. The most notable action was the assassination of Taleb Sami Abdallah, commander of Hezbollah’s Al Nasr unit, on June 12. In response, Hezbollah escalated its attacks against Israel, launching approximately 150 rockets on June 13.

These attacks also witnessed a notable development in the weapons used and the targets selected. This escalation suggests a potential expansion of the conflict into an open war, with growing concerns about its regional implications.

Escalation Indicators

The ongoing clash between Hezbollah and Israel, which has been intensifying since the war began on October 8, 2023, has entered a decisive phase. Both sides are now preparing for a full-scale war. On June 18, the Israeli army announced that it had an “approved and validated” plan for an “all-out war” against Lebanon. Furthermore, on June 26, the Israeli army announced the transfer of its forces from the southern front of the Gaza Strip to the border with Lebanon.

In fact, Israel has never ruled out the scenario of war with Lebanon since the first day of the clashes; rather, it has always adopted a strategy of systematic destruction to prepare the field for war. This includes the assassination of several Hezbollah field commanders and attempts to create a buffer zone by force in southern Lebanon. Most of its military strikes have concentrated within a 10- to 15-kilometer range inside the Lebanese border.

According to a report published by the Financial Times in late June, Israel has turned roughly five kilometers of the Lebanese border into an uninhabitable zone with, according to the British newspaper, “near-daily aerial bombardment, artillery shelling and the incendiary chemical white phosphorus.” This indicates Israel’s pursuit of a buffer zone, whether through military means or awaiting diplomatic outcomes.

Likewise, Hezbollah has also been preparing for the war scenario since the beginning of the clash. Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem stated this January that Hezbollah is preparing for an aggression that has a start but has no end. Since the second quarter of the year, Hezbollah’s advancement toward the war became clearer through reports on its field preparation for land and air engagement that include constructing trenches and tunnels in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley; the use of the Iranian-made Almas anti-tank missile in April that targeted an Israeli military base in Meron, Israel; and the deployment in May of a drone armed with two S-5 missiles that attacked an Israeli military vehicle and injured three soldiers near the northern community of Metula, Israel.

The escalating tensions are increasingly seen as a precursor to war, whether intentionally directed or driven by on-the-ground developments. Many countries have started urging their citizens to leave Lebanon, including Germany and the Gulf states. Additionally, several nations, including Canada and the United States, have dispatched forces to the region in preparation for evacuating their citizens.

Despite Washington’s involvement in efforts to de-escalate the situation on the Lebanese-Israeli border and its explicit opposition to war, America is not ruling out the possibility of conflict. Consequently, it has taken proactive measures by sending an amphibious ship and a Marine unit to the Mediterranean, as well as moving the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and its accompanying cruisers from the Red Sea to the eastern Mediterranean before their return to the United States.

Escalation Indications

The mutual escalation of military strikes between Hezbollah and Israel carries significant political and strategic implications, stemming from the military and media roles of both parties throughout the eight months of the war in Gaza. In his first speech on November 3, 2023, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah linked the party’s stance to the developments in the Gaza war and Israel’s behavior in Lebanon.

Regarding the war in Gaza, Israel has been conducting operations since May 7 in the last strongholds of Hamas in Rafah. This has coincided with escalations in various theaters of the Axis of Resistance, including Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen and armed factions in Iraq. In late May this year, the Houthis announced the start of the fourth phase of their operations: quantitative and qualitative escalations along with the threat of extending the confrontation to the Mediterranean Sea. On June 27, Axis factions in Yemen and Iraq announced joint operations targeting a site in the port of Haifa, in a steadily growing and escalating trajectory since their first joint announcement on June 6.

Nevertheless, the dynamics of the escalation cannot be viewed solely through the lens of developments on the ground in the Gaza Strip. Secondary theaters have shown signs of pursuing their own objectives and goals, independent of the main theater, with developments unique to each area or related to Iran. Despite the war in Gaza reaching a critical point with the nearing end of military operations in Rafah and the reconfiguration of the Gaza Strip to ensure a long-term security and military presence for the Israeli army, Hezbollah’s recent escalation is tied to responding to Israeli actions in Lebanon.

This indicates that Hezbollah’s most dramatic attacks were retaliatory actions against Israeli operations. Notably, the largest attack by Hezbollah since October 8, 2023, occurred on June 12 in retaliation for the assassination of Hezbollah commander Taleb Sami Abdallah. Similarly, in March, Hezbollah launched approximately 100 rockets in response to Israel’s targeting of Baalbek deep within Lebanese territory.

Conversely, Israeli actions have escalated significantly not just against Hezbollah, but against the entire Axis of Resistance. This includes assassinations of Palestinian faction leaders in Lebanon, such as the killing of Saleh Al-Arouri, deputy chief of Hamas’s political bureau, in Dahieh, Lebanon, in early January and the assassination of several Iranian military leaders and advisors in Syria. Among these operations was an attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, that resulted in the death of Mohammad Reza Zahidi, commander of Iran’s Quds Force in Lebanon and Syria.

These actions aim to prevent the creation of an official and popular perception in Israel that the deterrence equation against Iran and its allies has eroded unilaterally and to show that Israel still takes the initiative in establishing new and expanded rules of engagement. The strategic shock Israel experienced due to the attacks by Palestinian factions on October 7, 2023, has driven Israel to restore its image and undermine its adversaries on its borders regardless of the costs and consequences.

Israeli officials repeatedly tell both domestic and international audiences that they are in the midst of an existential war facing seven fronts: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, Iraqi factions, and armed groups in Syria and Iran. Therefore, breaking out wars on all fronts to restore Israeli security and prevent a repeat of the October 7 attacks would be preferable to solely resolving the conflict in Gaza while other arenas remain as future sources of threat.

Escalation Development Paths

The escalation between Hezbollah and Israel raises questions about the future of their confrontation, shaped by the dynamics and surrounding conditions of the conflict in general. It involves options such as escalating tensions, de-escalating them, or seeking diplomatic resolution. These paths are thus defined by the following:

The First Path: Limited Military Maneuver

There is a possibility that Israel may conduct a limited military maneuver to exert maximum pressure to either compel Hezbollah to yield or to maximize gains. The escalation between the two parties has seen several signs of escalating mutual pressure, either directly in the field or within the realm of psychological warfare. For instance, with assurances of U.S. support in any future war with Lebanon, Israeli officials have intensified their statements regarding their readiness to open a war front against Hezbollah, often referencing “sending Lebanon back to the Stone Age.” In response, Hezbollah has bolstered its own psychological warfare by showcasing drone footage of sensitive Israeli facilities in Haifa and scenes from northern Israel.

Israel may go beyond psychological warfare and conduct precise and targeted strikes against Hezbollah’s key infrastructure deep within Lebanon. Additionally, there could be limited ground incursions in the south. Such a maneuver is likely to involve intensive use of firepower over the coming weeks, potentially leading either to escalation into a comprehensive and wide-ranging war or to international and U.S.-led diplomatic intervention to achieve a diplomatic resolution.

The Second Path: Total War

The escalation into a full-scale war, or even the expansion of the war from a limited to a comprehensive one, depends on the end of the war in the Gaza Strip and considering it a secondary front in contrast to opening a new main front in Lebanon. This is linked to the adverse repercussions of Hezbollah's operations on the deterrence system that Israel has worked to establish as a central strategic policy. This may lead to a comprehensive war in an attempt to restore Israeli deterrence power to prevent any form of future clashes and to ensure the return of thousands of displaced people from the north to the settlements that were officially evacuated or from which residents fled.

 Hezbollah’s current escalation threatens to drag Israel and Lebanon into an open war, warned U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Despite American pressures to restrain escalation and return to diplomatic paths, a report published on Politico revealed that Washington conveyed a message through intermediaries to Hezbollah indicating that America would not actively prevent Israel from attacking Lebanon.

 Conversely, in this scenario, regional escalation and conflict expansion are likely, with factions known as battlefield units potentially joining Hezbollah. A report from the Associated Press disclosed that thousands of fighters from Iran-supported armed factions are prepared to join Hezbollah if escalation turns into a comprehensive war with Israel.

The Third Path: Diplomatic Settlement

This path aims for de-escalation and cessation of hostilities between the parties, relying on two fundamental factors. The first factor hinges on the success of U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent proposal for calm and a ceasefire, contingent on Hezbollah refraining from escalating its confrontations while the Gaza conflict persists.

 During his televised proposal, Biden also stated that Israel must accept the deal, with the United States working diplomatically to resolve their issues along the Lebanese border. The second factor involves international diplomatic efforts for settlement, facilitated by French and American mediators pushing towards the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which has been frozen since the end of the 2006 war.

The Fourth Path: The Continuation of The Current State

This pathway involves the continuation of field conditions leaning towards a scenario resembling attrition warfare, closely linked to the ongoing conflict in Gaza. The success of the United States and its Western allies in preventing further escalation is crucial. In this context, the pause of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea on its return journey from the Red Sea serves as a deterrence message to Hezbollah against advancing towards war, similar to previous deployments such as USS Gerald R. Ford off the Israeli coast in the eastern Mediterranean at the onset of conflict.

Additionally, U.S. messages to Israel highlight the risks of war with Hezbollah, notably from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Charles Brown, who emphasized that the United States may have limited capability to defend Israel against Hezbollah attacks beyond what it did this April in intercepting missile and drone assaults from Iran. Thus, escalation may persist for months with varying dynamics between escalation and calm, awaiting a transition to one of the previous three pathways.

Author: STRATEGIECS Team Policy Analysis Team