The conservative current enjoyed great victory in the Iranian legislative elections on February 21, 2020. The questions raised here are over whether they will succeed in formulating a new foreign policy vision? Also, will it tighten the internal screws on Rouhani's government?

The first since U.S. withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement, the latest elections occurred amid a critical period that is witnessing an intertwining crisis at internal and external levels within the Iranian regime. These elections came as a confrontation between Iran and international parties, mainly the U.S., especially in light of its continuous unilateral sanctions and "maximum pressure” policy. Added to that is the European troika activation of the "nuclear conflict resolution with Iran" mechanism after Iran implemented its 5-step procedure to ease its nuclear obligations.

After U.S. administration announced its withdrawal from Iran's nuclear deal in May 2018 and tightening of sanctions against Tehran in what has been known as the policy of "maximum pressure" to monitor Iran's regional behavior, successive events have increased the chances of direct confrontation between Tehran, Washington, and their allies.

These events include Iran's shooting-down of U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk drone in June 2019, rising tension in the Straits of Hormuz and Gibraltar over the oil tankers, accusing Iran of direct involvement in the attacks on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in September 2019 despite Houthi "Ansar Allah" movement claiming responsibility for the attack, in addition to the targeted killing of former commander of the Quds Force Qassem Soleimani, by direct order from U.S. President Donald Trump in Baghdad in early 2020; this reflects a slight change, if any, in the rules of engagement between Tehran and Washington.

Besides, the regime suffers internally from worsening economic and social crises, from repeated popular protests, increased demands, and the universality of its slogans from time to time.

Parliament results and Participation Rates

The conservative current won 221 out of 290 seats in the Iranian parliament, compared to 16 seats for its opponent, the reformist current, and 53 for independent candidates. The turnout in the legislative elections was almost 43% across Iran, and 26% in the capital, Tehran, with participation base of about 24 million voters out of 58 million eligible to vote, according to from Ministry of Interior in Iran. This percentage of participation is the lowest since the victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979, as predicted in many opinion polls conducted by several polling institutions, including the Iranian Students' Foundation prior to the elections. Despite official statements urging citizens to vote, the participation rate was low compared to that in the 2004 parliamentary elections, which resulted in a conservative parliament as well, with a participation rate of 51% at the time.

Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, described participation in these elections as a "religious duty", whereas the Head of the Presidential Office, Mahmoud Vaezi, believed that" [participation] is the best response to U.S. sanctions. This is the best response to the U.S. maximum pressure .. people's political participation shows that they can form a better parliament for their country and can solve their problems through this widespread presence." These official statements reflect the fear of a low participation rate, which is an indication of the regime's legitimacy.

The low participation rate which, according to the Minister of Interior, Rahmani Fazli, is due to "various incidents in the country: such as bad weather, coronavirus disease, and the shooting down of Ukrainian "Boeing 737" plane in Tehran, by mistake early this year." However, the low rate is in fact due to many intertwined factors, such as the deteriorating living conditions of citizens, in light of U.S. sanctions and weak management of the Rouhani government. As such, The Guardian Council, responsible for overseeing all referendum operations in Iran, deemed more than 90% of the current reformist candidates ineligible, including 90 MPs of the Tenth Parliament, which caused its followers to abstain from voting, negatively impacting the numbers.

Why Did Conservatives Sweep Elections?

Many factors played a role in the absolute control of the conservative current over the eleventh parliament seats as it did not participate in the elections in a unified coalition, but via seven main lists. Yet, the current's investment in Washington's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement has increased its chances of winning, raising the intensity of its anti-reformist current rhetoric which calls for openness to the west. Moreover, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei's appointment of the traditional conservative Ebrahim Raisi, as head of the judiciary in March 2019, strongly solidified the presence of the conservative current in the political scene in Iran.

The weak ability of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in managing the economic file under intense U.S. sanctions, high unemployment rates, psychological crisis and addiction cases among Iranian youth, as well as Washington's killing of the prominent leader of the Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Soleimani, are factors that contribute to creating a popular support base for the conservative current, comprising various political trends in its latest entitlement legislation.

Reasons for Deteriorating Status of Reformist Current 

The reasons behind the deteriorating status of reformist current at the political level are not limited to the Guardian Council denying eligibility to thousands of its candidates, as it would still lose majority even if all its candidates were granted eligibility. The decline of the current’s chances and its presence in the political arena is a product of crises in the Rouhani government, especially during the past two years, after U.S. administration announced its withdrawal from Iran's nuclear deal, and tightening of sanctions against Tehran, in addition to the dispute with the European troika (France, Britain Germany) over Iran's obligations per the agreement. This resulted in a stifling economic crisis that contributed to the creation of a state of congestion manifested in the "gasoline protests", which erupted after the government abruptly raised gas prices in November 2019, without any justification, reducing the trust in the government and decreasing the chances of the reformist current in the recent elections.

It is not unusual that the Guardians Council has denied granting the eligibility to the majority of the reformist candidates; in 2004, the Guardian Council refused to grant eligibility to the majority of the current candidates to run in the legislative race for the seventh parliament, which produced a conservative parliament with distinction. The council's key decisions were to bind the government to cancel all voluntary steps in the nuclear file with the International Atomic Energy Agency and reconsider cooperating with it. Following the absence of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami from power in 2005, and his successor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, assumed the position, a process that the researcher and academic, Mahjoub al-Zuwayri, described as “drying up reformists' sources of political presebce” has commenced. This manifested in the removal of the current's symbols from the legislative and executive authorities, which resulted in the imposition of house arrest on key figures in the current such as Mahdi Karoubi and Mir Hussein Mousavi, in what was known as the "Green Movement" protests that erupted after electing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for a second term.

The lack of presence of the reformist component in the next parliament allows a better opportunity for the traditional military and religious establishment to prevent passing the eleventh parliament to any legislation that could pose a threat to the "principles of the Iranian revolution", be it political, social or economic legislation.

The Future of Iran’s National Security Files 

Today, political circles discuss the expected role of the parliament with a conservative character in Iranian national security issues, namely "negotiation with Washington, the file of the nuclear agreement and Iran's regional influence". Besides, the vision targets the role that parliament will play at the internal level and its impact on the decisions made by the reformist government, until the next presidential elections are held in 2021.

The Nuclear File

The Iranian experience has proven over the past 41 years that the parliament does not carry out national security files, namely the nuclear file, as Iran signed the "Joint Action Plan 5+1" with the U.S. and European parties in Vienna in 2015. The role of parliament was limited to the ratification process with the support of 161 votes, the opposition of 59, and abstention of 13, in October of the same year. It is worth noting here, that the parliament that approved the agreement was conservative, after the reformist current boycott the elections due to their doubts in the 2009 presidential elections. However, it had the approval of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Khamenei.

Today, it is unlikely that the next council, in its conservative form, will accept any proposals related to negotiating Iran's nuclear program, especially under the stifling U.S. sanctions, as conservatives reiterate that Iranian President Rouhani has given up his country's nuclear hopes of lifting the sanctions, but the Republican U.S. administration has blown up all his endeavors.

Negotiations with Washington and the West

The conservative current has reservations in its dialogue policy with the U.S. and the West, as it considered these parties of low credibility. The majority of conservatives refused to sign the nuclear deal in 2015 and quickly demanded Iran's withdrawal from the deal after the U.S. administration withdrew in 2018. Also, conservatives demanded that the government does not implement its nuclear obligations after that date. Today, militancy appears to be the title of the coming stage, which leaves the door open to many scenarios, such as the heated tension between Tehran and Washington, leading to limited confrontations between the two parties and their allies in the region.

The Crisis with the FATF

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has re-blacklisted Iran on the day of the legislative elections on February 21, 2020, during the meeting in Paris. FATF's decision came after Iran was temporarily taken off the list in 2016 until it complied with international standards within an extended period of 18 months. The reason behind this decision lies in the inability of responsible Iranian authorities to ratify both: The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of (Palermo), and the Terrorist Financing Convention (TFC). Despite the tenth parliament’s approval of both conventions, the matter was resolved by the Expediency Discernment Council, which refused to ratify them both “in the name of protecting the revolution and the Islamic Republic." This is because Iran, if ratified, would be denied of funding its military allies in the region, such as Lebanon's “Hezbollah", and the Palestinian Hamas movement, among other affiliated military groups affiliated in Iraq and Yemen.

Such action requires further monitoring of financial transactions with Tehran to increase pressure on banks and companies that are yet to cut ties with Iran. It will also contribute to the collapse of the Iranian currency value, placing Iran in a new economic stalemate. The absolute conservative presence in parliament today is expected to complicate the dispute with the FATF, as the legislative authority stance is largely consistent with that of Iranian decision-making institutions, as it refuses to sign any agreements that would undermine the principles of the revolution or affect Iran's regional influence.

Iran's Regional Influence

Conservatives believe in the theory of the absolute guardianship of the jurist, regarding it with a sense of holiness. Similarly, followers of the current adhere to the principles of the Islamic revolution, in an effort "to defend the oppressed and the weak across the world, and to build the great nation." According to some preliminary assessments, several former commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij had managed to enter the 11th Majlis; one key figure is the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards Air Force Aerospace Force and former mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a strong candidate to chair the new parliament.

Besides military personnel, at least 15 former members of the former president's government, like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or his relatives, have managed to enter the parliament, most notably the former minister of Finance and Economic Affairs in Ahmadinejad’s government, Seyed Shamsuddin Hosseini.

The success of these figures to reach the legislative power comes after Washington killed the former commander of IRGC Quds Force Qassem Soleimani, indicating that "the response to the killing of Soleimani has not ended yet", as affirmed by Iran and its allies affirm. Furthermore, Lebanese Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, has stated during a memorial service held by Soleimani’s party in Beirut at the end of last January that the response is not a single process, but rather a long battle that should lead to the removal of the U.S. military presence in our region. Consequently, the region may witness escalations and reciprocal strikes between Tehran and Washington and their allies in the coming periods. Additionally, the 11th parliament is also expected to pass bills that serve the policies of the Revolutionary and to support its allocations in next year's budget in Iran. 

At the internal level, the new parliament is predicted to tighten the noose on Iranian President Rouhani's reformist government until the next presidential elections, by opposing its decisions, questioning its members and even withdrawing confidence from some, especially those in charge of economic files.

Different Readings

On the other hand, many readings have recently emerged in the Iranian press, contradicting the expectations of tightened parliament policies in internal matters. Iran, which is experiencing a series of stifling crises, may not seek additional hardship for which it may pay. One key reading is by Iranian university professor Jalal Jalali Zadeh in an article published in Eghtesad Saramad in February 2020, in which he ruled out the suggestion that the parliament will seek to increase tension and political friction in the government during the next cycle, stating that such a move "will undermine the goals and plans of the new parliament regarding the upcoming presidential elections." In the same vein, conservatives are predicted to control the three authorities in 2021; the researcher emphasized that the parliament’s focus in its eleventh cycle will be on resolving living and economic challenges in society to ensure its appropriate candidate reaches the presidential seat in 2021. Zadeh expected that Ali Khamenei's support for the government would prevent escalating political tensions between the authorities.

The stakes that Jalali Zadeh’s reading proves correct is high, as the current seeking to control the three authorities during the upcoming year must provide flexibility in its mechanism in dealing with internal and external crises.

Conclusions

• Iran resorts to militancy in addressing internal and external crises.
• Conservatives' control over the parliament reveals the political identity of the next Iranian president. It also paves the way for the discourse on the succession of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
• Iranian foreign policy is predicted to witness a slight change, as the Iranian Supreme Leader has the final say, not the parliament.
• The exclusion of the reformist current, by the Guardian Council, undermines the democratic process and may contribute to low rates of popular participation in the upcoming referendum processes.
• The exclusion of reformists would result in a council whose legislation is in line with traditional political and religious institutions of the Iranian Supreme Leader.
• The next parliament will give greater legitimacy to the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, through legislation related to the Guard's budget, as well as strengthening its external roles.
• Strengthening the status of the Revolutionary Guards may escalate tensions in the region, via possible exchange of strikes with Washington's allies.

Author: STRATEGIECS Team Policy Analysis Team